Simon was not satisfied with Ribbentrop`s behavior, saying that such statements contradicted normal negotiations before he left the negotiations. However, a few days later, on 5 June 1935, the British delegation changed its mind. Simon had discussed things with the British cabinet, which thought the deal might be in their best interest, and Simon had been ordered to accept Hitler`s offer while it was still on the table. They feared that Hitler would withdraw his offer and start building the German navy, which is much higher than the level they proposed. Britain knew from history that Germany could quickly have the same naval capability as it could. Due to the time it took to build warships and the short duration of the agreement, its impact was limited. German and British naval experts estimated that the first year Germany was able to reach the 35% mark was 1942. [47] In practice, lack of space in shipbuilding, design problems, shortages of skilled labor, and shortages of foreign currency for the purchase of the necessary raw materials slowed down the reconstruction of the German Navy. The lack of steel and non-ferrous metals caused by the Kriegsmarine ranking third behind the Army and Air Force in terms of German rearmament priorities meant that the Kriegsmarine (as the German Navy had been renamed in 1935) was still far from the 35% mark when Hitler terminated the agreement in 1939. [48] Talks between Sir Robert Craigie, a naval expert in the British Foreign Office, and Admiral Karl-Georg Schuster, MP for Ribbentrop, continued on June 5, 1935. The Germans said the ratios would only be tonnage ratios and that Germany would increase its tonnage to the level of Britain`s tonnage in the various categories of warships. That afternoon the British Cabinet agreed to accept the proposed tonnage ratio, and that evening Ribbentrop was informed of the Cabinet`s intention. In the following weeks, the ongoing talks in London resolved many technical issues, most of which concerned exactly how to determine tonnage ratios for different categories of warships.
The agreement between Germany and Britain, signed on June 18, 1935, which limited the size of the German navy to 35% of the British Commonwealth, was often criticized for the damage it caused to Britain`s efforts. France and Italy formed a common front against Hitler`s unilateral rejection of the colony of Versailles, which also led to the bitterness of relations between Britain and France at a time when Anglo-French unity towards Germany was indispensable. Nevertheless, the agreement had a broader meaning: it was part of the extensive but ultimately futile efforts to control weapons at sea in the interwar period, and at the same time an important first step in Britain`s cowardly Nazi Germany policy, which became known as appeasement. On May 22, 1935, the British cabinet voted to officially accept Hitler`s May 21 offers as soon as possible. [36] Sir Eric Phipps, the British ambassador in Berlin, informed London that “because of myopia French,” no chance of a naval agreement with Germany should be lost. [36] Chatfield told cabinet that it was very unwise “to oppose [Hitler`s] offer, but what the Frenchman`s reactions to it will be is even more uncertain and his reaction to our own battleship replacement even more.” [36] “Exchange of Notes Between Her Majesty`s Government in the United Kingdom and the German Government Concerning The Limitation of Naval Armaments – London, June 18, 1935. The Anglo-German naval agreement was an ambitious attempt by the British and Germans to achieve better relations, but it ultimately failed due to conflicting expectations between the two countries. For Germany, the Anglo-German naval agreement was to mark the beginning of an Anglo-German alliance against France and the Soviet Union,[3] while for Britain, the Anglo-German naval agreement was to be the beginning of a series of arms control agreements concluded to limit German expansionism.
The Anglo-German naval agreement was controversial both then and thereafter because the 35:100 tonnage ratio gave Germany the right to build a navy beyond the borders set out in the Treaty of Versailles, and London had concluded the agreement without consulting Paris or Rome. He overlooked, like other German politicians, that Britain is obliged to respond not only to the danger of a purely naval rival, but also to the domination of Europe by any aggressive military power, especially if that power is capable of threatening the Netherlands and the canal ports. British favor could never be bought by exchanging one factor for the other, and any country that tried to do so would be forced to create disappointment and disillusionment, as Germany did. [59] The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 and the Appeasement Aspect Since the agreement allowed Germany to build more warships than some of the Western countries, the Frenchman regarded this agreement as a betrayal. They said it was more appeasement towards Hitler, and they believed it would only increase Hitler`s appetite. France considered that Great Britain had no right to absolve the Germans of compliance with the maritime restrictions provided for in the Treaty of Versailles. The Naval Pact was signed in London on June 18, 1935, without the British government consulting France and Italy or informing them later of secret agreements that provided that the Germans could build warships more powerful in certain categories than any of the three Western countries that possessed at the time. The French saw this as a betrayal. They saw it as a new appeasement for Hitler, whose appetite for concessions was growing. They were also annoyed by the fact that the UK`s private agreement had further weakened the peace treaty and thus contributed to Germany`s growing overall military power. The Frenchman claimed that the United Kingdom did not have the legal right to absolve Germany of compliance with the maritime clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. [46] Hitler appointed Joachim von Ribbentrop to head the naval delegation on March 27, 1935.
Ribbentrop had been ambassador-plenipotentiary extraordinary and head of the NSDAP organization called the Ribbentrop office. .